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4 


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1.0 


I.I 


M    12.5 


mtf 


|30 

Hi  1^    12.2 
1*0    111112.0 


6" 


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11-25  III  1.4    111.6 


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Va 


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%   .^ 


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^;. 


7 


Photograpnk: 

Sciences 

Corporation 


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fill 


Or 
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oti 
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or 


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Til 
w» 

Ml 
dif 
en 
be< 

"g 

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me 


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1 


OXtop 


i^e 


MR 


DELIVER] 

The  I 
Mr.  BA 

It  was 
from  Ohio 
before  the 
rights  in  C 
belligerent 
away ;  bu 
mates  plaii 
debate,  or 
desired  hai 
Senator  frc 
and  in  Em 
Oregon  co 
the  49ih  p 
to  say  wh« 
of  public  ( 
site,  and  ui 
had  been  a 
•'ere  yet  i 
preparatioi 
determinec 
gon — they 

I  cannot 
the  public 
a  war  witli 
fear  that  I 
and  elsewl 
versy  migl 
people  mi^ 
in  languag 
aware  of  tl 
has  10  a  gr 
misfortune 
present  pu 

J.  f  0.  B, 


SPEECH 


OP 


MR.   BARROW,   OF  LOUISIANA, 


ON 


THE  OREGON  QUESTION. 


DELIVERED  IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  U.  S.,  ON  THE  30lh  OP  MARCH,  1846. 

The  resolution  in  relation  to  Oregon  being  under  consideration — 
Mr.  BARROW  addressed  the  Senate  nearly  as  follows : 

It  was  said,  Mr.  President,  early  in  the  session,  by  the  honorablt  Senator 
from  Ohio,  (Mr.  Allen,)  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  that 
before  the  American  people  were  called  upon  take  up  arms  in  defence  of  their 
rights  in  Oregon,  their  hearts  should  be  prepared  for  war.  1  had  imagined  the 
belligerent  spirit  then  manifested  on  that  side  of  the  chamber  to  have  passed 
away ;  but  the  renewed  exhibition  of  this  morning  from  the  same  quarter  inti- 
mates plainly  that  the  honorable  chairman  conceives  that,  if  not  by  him,  by  this 
debate,  or  by  somebody  or  something  else,  that  preparation  of  hearts  he  so  much 
desired  has  been  brought  about.  For  he  seemed  to  kindit  up  at  the  idea  of  the 
Senator  from  Massachusetts,  (Mr.  Webster,)  that  opinion  at  large,  both  at  home 
and  in  Europe,  had  settled,  or  was.fast  settling,  down  to  the  conclusion  that  this 
Oregon  controversy  ought  to  be  amicably  adjusted,  substantially  on  the  basis  of 
the  49lh  pa.-allel  of  latitude.  Called  upon  by  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts 
to  say  whether  or  not  he  concurred  with  him  in  the  supposition  of  this  tendency 
of  public  opinion,  the  honorable  chairman  declared  a  persuasion  direci'v  upoo- 
site,  and  unchanged  since  the  beginning  of  the  session.  So  far,  he  said,  ae>  he 
had  been  able  to  arrive  at  ihe  opinion  of  the  people  of  the  United  Stales,  tht  7 
•'ere  yet  in  favor  of  5i°  40\  The  honorable  chairman  must  then  consider  iiu 
preparation  of  the  American  heart  finisiied  ;  for,  whenever  it  is  by  our  people 
determined  to  assert  and  maintain  their  title  up  to  54°  40' — to  the  whole  of  Ore- 
gon— they  must  be  prepared  to  go  to  war,  and  need  indulge  no  other  thought. 

I  cannot  agree,  sir,  with  the  Senator  from  Ohio.  I  cannot  believe  that  either 
the  public  feeling  or  the  public  understanding  of  this  country  is  yet  prepared  for 
a  war  with  England  to  obtain  the  whole  of  Oregon.  Three  months  ago  I  did 
fear  that  by  the  deliberate,  systematic,  and  persevering  efl'orts  put  in  use  here 
and  elsewhere  to  mould  the  people  to  that  political  purpose,  the  existing  contro- 
versy might  be  shaped  to  a  bloody  conclusion.  I  did  fear  that  the  American 
people  might  be  involved  in  a  war  with  a  great  nation,  their  brothers  in  interest, 
in  language,  and  in  religion,  not  less  than  in  descent,  before  they  were  made 
aware  of  the  nature  and  the  value  of  the  subsisting  controversy.  But  my  fear 
has  10  a  great  degree  passed  away.  I  do  not  now  apprehend  any  such  national 
misfortune,  unless  our  Chief  Magistrate  should  abandon  what  I  believe  to  be  his 
present  purposes.  ,  ^    U-^'L 

T.  f  G.  B,  oldeon,  pTinltre.  L  *.H}  U» 


2 


On  this  question,  Mr.  President,  I  have  always  belonged  to  the  party  of  peaci 
and  of  compromise.  I,  for  one,  have  not  feared  to  express  the  desire,  the  anx 
ious  desire,  to  see  this  controversy  amicably  adjusted  by  fair  concessions  on  botl 
sides.  From  so  declaring,  no  fear  of  demagogue  denunciations  has  deterred  oi 
shall  deter  me.  I  am  not  (o  be  frightened  into  a  disloyal  and  ignominious  si 
lence  by  the  abandoned  but  too  easily  popular  cry  that  the  friends  of  modera 
tion,  of  reason,  and  of  peace,  are  "  the  British  party."  If  against  a  rash  oi  a  gra 
«uitou8  quarrel  we  maintain  tlie  duty  and  interests  of  peace,  we  are  assailed  as 
the  friends  of  England,  or  of  any  nation  but  our  own ;  if  we  deprecate  a  wai 
as  impolitic  as  it  is  unnecessary  and  unnatural — if  we  point  to  the  losses,  the 
disasters  which  will  follow  a  contest  so  causeless,  we  are  instantly  charged  with 
an  unwillingness  to  defend  the  honor  of  our  country,  with  timidity  and  sympathy 
with  tile  public  adversary. 

Such  is  the  system  of  perversion  and  calumny  with  which  we  must  now  con^ 
tend,  in  attempting  to  do  our  duty  as  public  agents,  as  legislators,  and  as  stateS' 
men,  in  a  land  oi  free  debate.  We  may  gpeak,  but  at  the  peril  of  being  given 
over  to  denunciation,  as  little  less  than  traitors  or  cowards.  We  must  speak  on 
no  side  but  one  of  qiicslions  gotten  up  for  tlie  express  purpose  of  dividing  the 
country  between  the  frieniis  of  what  is  moderate  and  good,  and  those  who  are 
expected  to  form  a  larger  party — the  favorers  of  every  rabid  pretension,  of  every 
■dangerous  and  violent  movement.  If  we  are  not  personally  and  in  express 
terms  charged  with  cowardice  or  want  of  patriotism,  the  particular  charge  is 
made  by  iiiuenJo,  and  the  general  one  by  fulmination. 

There  are  Qcrtainly  those,  sir,  with  whom  such  political  arts  as  these  will 
succeed;  with  whom  a  reputation  for  courage  and  patriotism  can  be  made  by 
thus  going  to  extremes  on  every  question  here  that  should  be  one  of  grave  and 
sincere  deliberation.  But  I  trust  that  this  easy  valor  and  wordy  public  spirit 
are  not  capable  of  seriously  misleading  the  American  people.  For  myself,  I 
am  but  one  of  the  many  hnnil)le  citizens  who,  with  no  greater  interest  or  timid- 
ity than  thousands  of  others,  yet  fear  a  conflict  with  England.  I  confess  that  I 
dread  war,  and  that  I  have  beei.  alarmed  in  "special  at  the  prospect  ci"  a  present 
war  with  Great  Britain.  But  was  this  on  account  of  considerations  personal  to  my- 
self? No  ;  they  only  regarded  the  country.  I  consider  such  a  war  as  the  great- 
est calamity  that  can  i)efall  this  nation.  But,  independently  of  its  havoc  of  life 
and  property,  tlie  desolation  it  will  leave  far  and  wide  behind  it,  !  believe  a  war 
between  us  and  England  will  involve  much  of  the  civilized  world  ;  will  inflict 
upon  it  an  incalculable  amount  of  wo ;  and  will  throw  back  for  half  a  century 
the  advancing  cause  of  civil  and  religious  liberty.  As  to  danger,  a  war  between 
us  and  England  could  bring  none  to  a  member  of  Congress  who  wished  to  keep 
out  of  it.  If  such  a  war  comes,  my  own  State  is  likely  to  be  one  of  the  chief 
theatres  of  deadly  conflict.  There  is  too  much  to  induce  England  again  to  in 
vade  Louisiana;  her  beautiful  and  exposed  capital,  her  crescent  city,  will  not  es- 
cape, and  we  shall  see  the  waters  of  the  majestic  Mississippi  stained  with  the 
blood  of  its  best  citizens.  It  is  for  this,  and  not  for  any  abject  individual  dread, 
that  I  fear  war.  If  I  chose,  1  can  remain  on  my  plantation,  and  pursue  its  avo- 
cations unmolested  by  the  enemy;  for  who  need  fight  that  can  employ  a  substi- 
tute? It  is  not  the  wealthy  who  have  need  to  fear  a  war  with  England  ;  the  army 
will  not  be  made  up  of  the  rich,  the  aristocrats  so  called,  unless  they  see  fit  volun- 
tarily to  join  it.  It  is  tlie  poor  man  wiio  is  to  sutler — the  mechanic,  tlie  day  la- 
borer, the  hardy  ploughman — torn  from  his  home  and  family,  whose  life,  the 
sole  stay  of  that  family,  will  be  placed  in  danger ;  tins  is  the  class  who  will  suf- 
fer, and  these  are  they  whom  it  is  meant  to  fire  with  phrenzy,  and  lead  on  to 
war  by  this  outcry  against  men  upon  whom  liie  evils  of  war  cannot  fall  half  so 
heavily.     There  will,  sir,  in  short,  be  two  sorts  of  men  engaged  in  this  war. 


■should  it 
secondly. 
To  wh 
^hardly  sa 
them  are 
matter  wl 
these  wal 
tish  comi 
the  two  h 
oners  of 
the  highe 
ernment 
well  as  C 
captured 
xilous,  to 
this  great 
"be  as  littl 
It  has 
above  all 
heartily  c 
•what  hns 
ty  ?     Ha 
all  party 
but  I  avei 
Whig  pa 
"believe  to 
I  say,  '* 
•with  plea 
could  dri 
assertion 
vamped  u 
No,  sir 
affect  pai 
that  whic 
old,  of  c 
new  ones 
her  sleep 
constant 
Herods  c 
feelings  « 
the  kindi 
better  thi 
and  do  a 
this  desu 
And  wh; 
Toughly 
shall,  in 


B  party  of  peace 
desire,  the  anx 
iessions  on  botJ 
has  deterred  oi 
ignominious  si 
lids  of  modera 
a  rash  ot  a  gra 
are  asiailed  as 
ieprecale  a  wai 
the  losses,  the 
y  charged  with 
r  and  sympathy 

must  now  con- 
,  Rnd  as  states- 
of  being  given 
must  speak  on 
Df  dividing  the 
those  who  are 
nsion,  of  every 
nd  in  express 
ular  charge  is 

as  these  will 
be  made  by 
e  of  grave  and 
y  public  spirit 
For  myself,  I 
erost  or  timid- 
confess  that  I 
3t  cf  a  present 
)er8onal  to  my- 
sr  as  the  great- 
havoc  of  life 
believe  a  war 
J ;  will  inflict 
half  a  century 
1  war  between 
ashed  to  keep 
le  of  the  ciiief 
id  again  to  in- 
y,  will  not  es- 
lined  with  the 
ividual  dread, 
•ursue  its  avo- 
ploy  a  substi- 
iid  ;  the  army 
'  see  lit  volun- 
c,  the  day  la- 
hose  life,  the 
who  will  suf- 
iid  lead  on  to 
Dt  fall  half  so 
J  in  this  war. 


should  it  eonie :  first,  those  who  Iiavc  made  the  speeches  to  kindle  it  up  ;  and, 
secondly,  those  who  will  have  to  fight  it  out. 

To  which  of  these  classes  members  of  Congress  will  generally  belong,  I  need 
liardly  say  ;  for  who  will  expect  them  to  go  into  the  field,  or  what  proportion  of 
them  are  likely  to  expose  themselves  ?  For  my  own  part,  I  heartily  believe,  no 
matter  what  we  iiay  hear,  that  there  is  as  much  bravery  and  patriotism  within 
these  walls  as  without ;  quite  as  much,  but  not  a  bit  more  ;  and  should  the  Bri- 
tish commit  the  folly  of  again  invading  tjiis  city,  does  any  body  suppose  that 
the  two  houses  of  Congress  will  sit  here  and  suflTer  themselves  to  be  made  pris- 
oners of  war  ?  Vain  expectation  !  rash  conjecture  !  Congress  can  adjourn  to 
the  highest  peak  of  the  Alleghanies.  Thither,  or  still  west  of  them,  this  Gov- 
«rnment  will  probably  in  that  case  retire.  The  President  and  his  Cabinet,  as 
well  as  ('ongress,  would  consider  it  unwise  to  expose  to  the  hazard  of  being 
captured  by  the  British  arms  so  many  patriots.  It  is  idle,  then,  and  even  ridic- 
ulous, to  talk  of  fear,  of  personal  fear,  or  its  opposite,  as  connected  wiili  us  on 
this  great  national  question.  There  being  to  us  no  occasion  for  fear,  there  can 
Ije  as  little  to  vaunt  of  our  bravery. 

It  has  been  said,  Mr.  President,  that  this  is  a  question  which  ought  to  soar 
above  all  thought  of  party.  The  sentiment  is  a  just,  a  noble  one  ;  and  I  very 
heartily  concur  in  it.  But,  sir,  out  of  this  chamber,  (for  I  will  say  nothing  of 
■what  liHS  occurred  within  it,)  has  the  question  so  held  itself  aloft,  above  all  par- 
ty ?  Has  it  done  sdjkrith  those  who  are  loudest  to  claim  that  we  should  forget 
all  parly  in  this  matter?  I,  sir,  am  a  Whig,  and  trust  in  God  ever  to  be  one; 
but  I  aver  that,  had  I  this  instant  to  choose  between  the  total  annihilation  of  the 
Whig  party,  and  a  war  with  England  for  the  whole  of  Oregon — a  war  which  I 
"believe  to  be  totally  unjust,  unnecessary,  and  impolitic — without  hesitation  would 
I  say,  "  Let  the  Whig  party  be  annihilated."  I,  for  one,  should  see  it  perish 
•with  pleasure,  if  a  spirit  so  unpatriotic,  so  foul,  so  abominable  directed  it,  that  it 
could  drive,  or  attempt  to  drive,  this  country  into  a  war  with  England,  for  the 
assertion  of  this  fresh  territorial  dogma — this  bold  political  paradox — our  newly 
vamped  up  title  to  the  whole  of  Oregon. 

No,  sir ;  were  I  capable  of  looking  on  the  question  only  as  by  the  event  it  will 
aflect  parlies  and  decide  their  fate,  I  winild  ti\ke  a  course  precisely  opposite  to 
that  which  I  have  chosen  as  my  duty;  I  would  stir  the  dying  embers  of  every 
old,  of  every  sottish,  of  every  unchristian  animosity  or  prt-judice,  and  kindleup 
new  ones  ;  I  would  denounce  the  rapacity  of  England;  her  domineering  spirit, 
her  sleepless  efforts  to  circumvent,  her  fixed  purpose  lo  destroy  us;  her  aim  as 
constant  to  in-iult  whenever  she  cannot  injure  us.  I  would,  sir,  out-Herod  all  the 
Herods  of  Oiegon ;  I  would  do  all  I  could  to  stir  up  here  at  home  the  worst 
feelings  of  our  nature,  and  to  excite  passions  as  fierce,  as  foolish,  and  as  bad  in 
the  kindred  people  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic ;  I  would,  in  short,  if  nothing 
better  than  the  iiilerests  of  party  swayed  me,  llame  out  a  furious  St"  40'  man, 
and  do  all  in  my  power  to  hurry  England  and  America  into  deadly  conflict  for 
this  desolate  corner  of  a  "erritory  uncertain  of  title  and  questionable  of  value. 
And  why,  sir,  if  a  mere  ptirty  man,  would  I  do  all  tliis  ?  Because  I  am  tho- 
Toughly  persuadi'd  that,  if  this  or  any  oiher  Administration,  but  this  particularly, 
shall,  in  the  headlong  prosecution  of  an  unjust  claim,  M'hether  at  the  dictate  of 
an  electioneering  fDUvenlion,  plunge  this  ppiicc-lovinc  country  into  the  sin  and 
suilering  of  a  war  as  needless  as  it  will  be  ferocious,  the  People  will  no  sooner 
have  tasted  the  woes  of  such  a  contest  than  their  vcnsTeaiicc  will  overwhelm 
those  who  brought  them  into  it.  At- such  a  time  the  I'orius  of  the  Constitution 
will  scarcely  shield  them ;  they  would  be  driven  from  power  wilhin  a  day.  if  it 
were  possible  ivilhoul  lramplit\g  in  the  dnst  our  Consiitutioii.  Upon  the  Presi- 
■tJent,  the  Cabinet,  the  Parly,  ihal  had  wantonly  comiuiited  such  a  crime  and  such 


a  folly,  would  rest  a  public  execration  that  would  never  let  them  sec  power  while 
the  popular  memory  lasttsd ;  and  Whigs  and  Whig  principles,  a  conservative 
moderation,  justice,  and  prudence,  would  take  a  long  possession  of  the  people's 
contidence  and  affection.  Such,  sir,  would  be  the  consequences  of  a  war  for 
such  an  object  and  under  such  circumstances — so  unprovoked,  so  impolitic,  and 
so  certain  to  be  calamitous.  For  the  Whigs,  as  a  party,  such  a  war  would  ac- 
complisl)  every  thing,  but  at  a  cost  to  the  country  too  terrible  for  any  Whig  ever  to 
desire.  If  you  will  tluis  put  us  into  power,  it  must  be  in  spite  of  all  we  can  do. 
God  preserve  us  from  an  as(;endency  purchased  so  dear !  We  can  wait  until  milder 
means  shall  effect  the  same  great  end.  To  the  Whigs,  then,  this  question  it  above 
all  party.  To  the  credit  of  the  country  this  question  was  long  above  all  party. 
For  more  than  twcity-tive  years  no  party  consented  to  look  on  it  in  any  but  a 
national  light;  nay  from  its  very  rise,  from  the  foundation  of  our  claim  in  that 
quarter,  no  Administration  nor  any  party  had  ever  attempted  to  make  of  it  any 
but  an  American  question.  But,  when  assembled  at  Baltimore,  a  certain  cele- 
brated convention,  which  (to  use  the  language  of  one  of  its  members)  "  was  or- 
ganized by  faction  and  governed  by  demagogues,"  (I  use  the  words  of  the  Sen- 
ator from  North  Carolina — Mr.  IIavwooo — addressed  to  us  the  other  day,)  then 
and  there  for  the  first  time  this  national  controversy  was  seized  by  party,  made 
to  receive  its  stamp  and  its  spirit,  and  pushed  to  extravagance,  in  order  that,  b3r 
this  very  impress  of  ultraism  and  of  violence,  it  might  seem  to  be  more  distinct- 
ly their  own,  and  none  but  their  own.  And  why  was  thi^onef  Through  a» 
extreme  party  necessity,  as  the  last  desperate  stake  of  a  party  that  had  played 
away  every  thing  it  could  beg  or  borrow.  On  all  of  the  old  and  legitimate  ques- 
tions they  saw  they  were  beaten  and  overthrown,  and  they  knew  they  must  force 
new  issues,  upon  which  excitement  and  humbuggery  had  not  been  exhausted^ 
or  that  they  were  gone.  The  domestic  questions — those  of  internal  adminis- 
tration, the  only  proper  ones  between  parlies — ^-had  been  used  to  excite  and  de- 
lude the  people,  until  these  could  excite  and  delude  no  longer ;  it  was  necessary 
then  to  call  to  tlieir  aid  still  stronger  stimulants,  such  as  all  before  had  shrunk 
from  employing — questions  of  foreign  policy,  that  the  most  disloyal  had  never 
before  dared  to  endanger  and  corrupt,  by  committing  them  to  the  bad  influences 
of  party,  and  the  divisions  it  must  breed.  To  create  those  very  divisions  wa» 
their  object — to  produce  distractions  about  national  questions,  which  they  coulct 
no  longpr  raise  abo'it  domestic  ones.  An  excitement  was  their  last  hope.  With- 
out it  their  defeat  was  certain ;  with  it,  at  whatever  cost  to  the  country,  they 
might  still  succeed. 

In  this  manner  and  for  these  motives  came  to  be  adopted  by  this  memorable 
convention  the  more  remarkable  resolution  that  our  title  to  the  whole  of  Oregon 
was  «' clear  and  unquestionable."  The  time  of  its  passage  was  not  less  singu- 
lar than  its  other  attendant  circumstances.  It  was,  as  the  Senator  from  New 
Jersey  (Mr.  Miller)  has  observed,  introduced  and  carried  on  the  third  day  of 
the  convention,  before  breakfast,  after  the  departure  from  Baltimore  of  more  than 
a  majority  of  the  convention.  As  to  the  hour,  I  cannot  agree  with  the  Senator 
from  New  Jersey,  that  it  was  ill  chosen.  At  no  other  had  such  discretion  reign- 
ed in  the  proceedings ;  it  was  well,  then,  to  do  one  thing  at  a  discreet  if  an  un- 
usual time  of  day;  and  judicious  to  have  the  actors  at  least  sober,  if  the  resolu- 
tions were  not. 

This,  sir,  was  the  first  time  that  into  the  present  controversy  party  views  were- 
introduced,  and,  as  I  have  said,  studiously  introduced  at  an  inopportune  time^ 
before  an  unfit  body,  in  an  exaggerated  and  inflammatory  form  of  assertion,  for 
the  purpose  of  compelling  the  opposition  of  prudent  and  right-thinking  men,  in 
the  hope  that  such  would  prove  to  be  the  minority.  This,  as  every  body  knows, 
was  the  entire  origin  of  that  declaration  which  President  Polk  thought  himseir 


power  while 
conservative 
the  people's 
of  a  war  for 
n politic,  and 
ar  would  ac- 
Whig  ever  to 
1  we  can  do. 
t  until  milder 
tion  If  above 
ve  all  party, 
in  any  but  a 
claim  in  that 
ke  of  it  any 
certain  cele- 
i)  "  was  or- 
of  the  ^ca- 
!r  day,)  then 
party,  made 
rder  that,  by- 
ore  diHtinct- 
rhrough  ait 
had  playe<V 
timate  ques- 
y  must  force 
1  exhausted^ 
lal  adminis- 
:cite  and  de- 
18  necessary 
had  shrunk 
tl  had  never 
d  influences 
visions  was 
1  they  could! 
)pe.    With- 
uutry,  they 

memorable 
of  Oregon 
lesd  singu- 
froni  New 
liird  day  of 
'  more  than 
he  Senator 
ition  reign- 
'X  if  an  un- 
tile resolu' 

'iews  were- 
tune  time^ 
lertion,  for 
ig  men,  in 
Jy  knows. 
It  himself 


bound,  by  this  behest  of  a  party  convention,  to  make  in  his  inaugirr^;  and 
hence  indisputably  has  flowed  the  entire  difficulty  in  which  he  and  the  two  coun- 
tries are  involved. 

In  the  primitive  days  of  our  Republic,  it  was  usual  for  the  Executive  and 
Congress  to  consult  the  Constitution  and  the  Laws,  the  experience  of  other 
ages,  the  plain  principles  of  justice  and  of  truth,  when  they  were  considering 
grave  questions  of  our  public  policy,  or  duty,  or  interest.  In  the  present  time 
•of  corruption,  ambition,  and  vain  glory,  few  politicians  stop  to  consider  these 
■old  motives  and  methods,  from  which  our  national  glories,  our  former  uncoutami- 
nated  honors  rose.  Other  considerations  almost  alone  are  weighed.  The  great 
•question — nearly  the  only  question — now  presented  to  the  people  is  this:  "What 
policy  will  most  secure  the  election  of  our  candidates  V  "  Hy  what  means  can 
we  best  circumvent  our  adversaries  ?"  What  is  right,  or  fit,  or  wise,  or  good 
for  the  nation,  or  just  towards  other  countries,  or  even  towards  our  own  citizens, 
few  politicians  give  themselves  the  trouble  to.inquire.  Now.  what  had  the  Bal- 
timore Convention  thus  decreed  before  breaking  its  fast  ?  The  whole  of  Oregon 
and  the  whole  of  Texas;  the  former  to  be  "  reoccupied,"  and  the  latter  to  be 
"reannexed."  Accordingly,  of  these  two,  in  the  very  midst  of  these  exhorta- 
tions to  banish  all  party  considerations,  we  have  been  told  by  the  honorable  Se- 
nator fro.T.  Indiana  (Mr.  Hanngoan)  that  "they  are  twin-sisters,"  brought  forth 
by  the  same  mother  at  the  same  birth ;  that  it  was  incumbent  on  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States,  mt  at  least  the  Democratic  portion  of  it,  to  stand  by  Oregon, 
to  go  for  it  up  to  5'^40',  mar  or  no  war;  that  those  who  owe  fealty  to  the  party 
at  all  are  bound  to  show  themselves  its  true  liegcp,  whatever  the  consequences  ; 
and  more  especially  as  one  branch  of  the  Baltimore  decree,  the  introduction  of 
Texas  into  the  Union,  has  been  already  accomplished. 

So  thought  the  President:  he  thought  himself  bound  by  the  order  of  the  party 
which  had  nominated  him  under  such  strange  circumstances,  with  such  a  dis- 
cordance of  opinions.  Hence,  and  hence  only,  his  inaugural  declaration ;  that 
Jirst  mistake,  (as  I  understood  the  Senator  from  Massachusetts  this  morning  to 
call  it,)  that  mistake,  if  it  deserves  not  a  harsher  name,  from  which  has  flowed 
all  our  present  trouble.  When  it  was  made,  I  was  struck  with  surprise  that  on 
such  an  occasion  such  a  topic  should  even  be  touched  upon.  He  was  not  ad- 
dressing Congress,  but  the  people;  and  that  people  had  no  cause  to  expect  or 
to  wish  any  revelation  of  the  grounds  or  manner  in  which  he  meant  to  conduct 
an  important  and  delicate  negotiation.  He  could  not  yet  well  know  what  he 
ought  to  do,  much  less  could  he  know  what  the  Government  opposed  to  us  could 
he  brought  to  do,  by  negotiation.  The  history  of  the  past,  the  acts  and  eflbrts 
of  many  wise  statesmen,  as  wary  and  resolute  as  he,  should  have  warned  him 
that  the  matter  was  not  of  that  sort  which  can  be  setded  olf*hand,  and  by  one 
side  otily.  He  should  have  known  that  an  inaugural  address  was  no  time  nor 
place  in  which  to  broach  such  a  subject— especially  if  he  meant  to  take  in  it 
new  and  extreme  grounds.  Such  intentions  should  certainly  have  been  "  locked 
up  in  his  own  bosom,"  at  least  as  closely  as  his  organ  of  the  press  tells  us  that 
his  true  purposes  in  the  matter  arc  now  kept,  when  Congress  is  left  in  uncer- 
"tainty,  and  the  country  in  alarm.  I  think  he  should  have  been  more  mysterious 
then,  or  less  mysterious  now.  This  early,  unguarded,  and  (1  must  be  allowed 
to  say)  uninformed  committal  of  himself,  could  have  no  good  end;  could  only 
•embarrass  and  endanger  the  negotiations  of  which  he  was  about  to  take  the 
supreme  direction.  And,  accordingly,  we  sen  that  his  own  first  important  step 
in  them  was  directly  athwart  this  gratuitous  public  pledge  ;  in  it  he  had  promised 
to  give  up  no  part  of  Oregon;  and  he  presently  offered  to  yield  nearly  one-half 
of  it!  That  fact  is  commentary  enough  upon  the  propriety  of  such  a  declaration. 
But,  besides,  we  all  know  the  sensation  and  effects  produced  by  it  elsewhere ; 


fr 


and  they  who  take  the  trouble  to  examine  it  in  all  its  consequences,  must  eoin» 
to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  a  most  unf(»rtunate  blunder  in  the  Executive. 

Sir,  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  epeak  of  the  Chief  Magistrate  with  acrimony  or 
without  respect.  1  have  towaids  him  no  personal  feelings  of  unkindness,  how- 
ever opposed  to  him  and  his  party  politically.  He  whose  secret  views  are  a. 
matter  of  angry  doubt  and  contest  among  his  confidants,  or  those  who  might 
naturally  be  so,  is  little  likely  to  have  made  disclosures  to  an  opponent.  The- 
documents  he  has  caused  to  be  published,  and  the  authentic  facts  with  which  all- 
are  acquainted,  form  my  rnly  sources  of  information.  From  these,  however,  I 
have  drawn  certain  plain  nouclusions  as  to  the  motives  which  have  influenced 
the  Executive  management  of  the  Oregon  controversy,  and  as  to  the  consequence* 
of  that  management.  If  among  those  who  stand  nearest,  of  this  body,  about  the 
President,  and  most  enjoy  the  advantage  of  receiving  his  own  explanations  of 
what  he  has  communicated  for  the  public  instruction,  there  is  such  an  entire  and 
direct  did'erence  as  to  the  interpretation  which  is  to  be  set  upon  his  declarations 
and  intentionf!,  it  need  excite  no  surprise  if  I  should  venture  to  construe  things 
for  myself.  When  the  priests  fall  out  and  deliver  utter  contradictory  oracles, 
the  profane  are  at  liberty  to  believe  as  much  or  as  little  as  they  like  or  can  un- 
derstand. 

Mr.  President,  we  have  before  us  a  most  extraordinary  and  (I  must  say)  hu- 
miliating public  spectacle.  It  is  not  merely  unprecedented  in  the  history  of  the 
country,  hut  without  any  shadow  of  parallel  or  even  of  analogy.  We  sit  here  a 
part  of  that  great  National  Council,  which,  along  with  the  ntecutive,  directs  the 
aflfairs  of  this  people  ;  of  that  council  we  are  the  branch  which  more  directly  and 
intimately  shares  with  him  the  management  of  our  foreign  relations.  Amongst 
us  he  has  a  decided  party  majority,  anxious  to  aflbrd  him  support  in  all  his  mea- 
sures ;  and  yet  not  only  are  we,  as  a  body,  denied  to  know  what  it  so  much  be- 
hooves we  should,  as  the  President's  advisers  and  a  co-ordinate  branch  of  the 
Government,  understand — his  real  purposes  in  the  momentous  questions  before 
us— but  they  are  an  enigma  to  'lis  very  adherents  here,  who  cannot,  for  their 
lives,  settle  between  them  his  true  meaning  and  intention !  There  never  was, 
before,  a  period  when  some  one  in  the  Senate  was  not  authorized  to  speak  for 
the  Executive,  made  regularly  acquainted  with  his  views,  and  ready  to  put  right 
those  who  misconstrue  his  plans  or  language.  A  part  of  his  supporters  tell  u» 
that  he  is  in  every  manner  pledged  to  nothing  less  than  54°  40',  or  war;  the  other 
part,  equally  zealous  and  equally  positive,  assure  us  that  he  has  never  had  a 
thought  beyond  49°.  The  Senator  from  Indiana,  (Mr.  Hanneqan,)  backed  by 
the  high  authority  of  the  distinguished  Senator  from  Michigan,  (Mr.  Cass,)  and 
that  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  (.Mr.  Allen,) 
whose  potiition  implies  the  posscsiiion  of  the  President's  complete  confidence 
here,  declares  that,  if  there  is  any  truth  in  man  or  in  Holy  Writ,  the  President  i» 
irretrievably  engaged  to  54°  40';  that  should  he  falter,  turn  back,  and  not  lead  on 
his  gallant  followers  up  to  the  Russian  line,  he  will  be  recreant  to  his  party,  his 
principles,  and  the  Baltimorj  Convention;  that  should  he  desert  his  standard) 
bearing  aloft  the  mighty  motto  of  54°  40',  it  will  sink  him  to  a  depth  of  damna- 
tion from  which  the  very  hand  of  resurrection  can  never  pluck  him  up.  Now, 
this  was  rather  strong  language,  and  this  hypothetical  denunciation  made  me  feell 
exceedingly  uncomfortable,  lest  the  Senator  had  really  got  a  peep  behind  the- 
curtain  of  the  President's  intentions,  and  knew  what  he  would  do.  I  was,  too,. 
the  more  disturbed,  being,  as  I  have  said,  a  peace-man,  but  on  terms  which  I 
shall  explain  before  I  take  my  seat ;  because,  in  many  particulars,  that  Senator's 
interpretation  is  the  obvious  one  of  the  message  itself.  My  alarm,  however,  was 
much  allayed  by  what  was  said  by  the  Senator  from  North  Carolina.  (Mr. 
Haywood,)  supposed  to  enjoy  in  a  peculiar  degree  the  personal  confidence  aad 


ifTection  of 
ie  has  assur 
9US  ;  that  the 
neither  advai 
and,  moreovi 
the  revelalioi 
dent,  not  iha 
state  of  the 
land  at  the  p 
But  to  pro 
tions  in  this 
newspapers 
that  this  Or( 
to  be  exceet 
have  very  st 
charged  wit 
gready  dislii 
made,  to  sul 
I  say,  the 
dent's  first  i 
have  had  o 
have  meant 
that  looks  t 
against  stan 
mends  no  ii 
what  is  still 
presents  to 
deprive  us 
On  the  o 
he  is  anxioi 
contrary, 
a  settlemen 
that  he  nav 
I  myself 
tion  being 
the  fence,' 
was  follow 
war,  quiet 
menl  of  tin 
then  some 
things,  w« 
j    was  altogi 
after  readi 
pretations 
terpretatic 
plainly  pi 
himself  ii 
Now,  t 
have  enti 
question, 
necessar] 
conseque 
Senate's 
from  the 


mu«t  eoni& 
tive. 

crimony  or 
Iness,  how- 
iews  are  a. 
who  might 
lent.     The 
I  which  all- 
however,  I 
influenced 
iseqtience* 
about  the 
anations  of 
entire  and 
eclarations 
true  things, 
ry  oracles, 
or  can  un- 

"  say)  hu- 
ory  of  the 
sit  here  a 
Jirects  the 
irecily  and 
Amongst 
1  his  mea- 
much  be- 
nch of  the 
ons  beforfr 
I  for  their 
ever  was, 
speak  for 
'  put  right 
rs  tell  us 
the  other 
ver  had  a 
lacked  by 
-ASS,)  and 
Allen,)' 
onfidencfr 
esidentiff. 
>t  lead  on 
•arty,  his 
standard, 
r  damn^- 
'.    Now, 
3  me  feeli 
hind  the 
Vis,  too,, 
which  I 
•enator's 
ver,  was 
a.  (Mr. 
oce  and 


ir 

ifTection  of  the  President,  his  old  school  associat«,  and  perhaps  his  classmate, 
ie  has  assured  us  that  the  reading  of  the  54°  40'  gentlemen  was  toUaily  errone- 
9U8  ;  that  the  President  had  planted  himself  on  the  parallel  of  40^  ;  that  he  couUI 
neither  advance  nor  recede  from  it  without  rendering  himself  infamous  forever; 
and,  moreover,  having  the  Senator  turn  his  back  upon  him.  Sir,  I  confide  ia 
the  revelations  of  the  cool,  sagacious,  and  prudent  personal  friend  of  the  Piesi* 
dent,  not  that  I  believe  it  the  true  reading  of  the  message,  but  as  indicating  a  later 
state  of  the  Executive  mind,  and  a  wish  for  the  present  to  compromise  withEn^ 
land  at  the  parallel  of  49". 

But  to  proceed  to  another  point.  We  collect  sufficiently,  from  many  declara- 
tions in  this  and  the  other  House  of  Congress,  and  from  the  voice  of  various 
newspapers  paij  by  the  Government  to  give  candid  information  about  its  acts, 
that  tills  Oregon  business  has  been  admirably  conducted,  and  that  to  doubt  it  is 
to  be  exceedingly  factious  and  even  unpatriotic.  Nevertheless,  as  I  happen  to 
have  very  strong  doubts  of  that  sort,  I  will  state  them,  at  whatever  hazard  of  being 
charged  with  taking  the  British  side  of  the  question.  That  charge  does  not 
greatly  disturb  me  ;  and  I  feel  an  entire  willingness,  when  the  charge  is  formally 
made,  to  submit  it  to  the  judgment  of  my  constituents. 

I  say,  then,  that  the  Oregon  question  has  bean  mismanaged  from  the  Presi- 
dent's first  ill-judged  inau^<<<-al  declaration  up  to  the  latest  revelation  which  we 
have  had  on  the  subject.  By  his  message  and  by  his  management  he  cannot 
have  meant  or  desired  or  expected  war;  for  in  his  message  he  recommends  nothing 
that  looks  to  war;  oii^ie  contrary,  he  dilates,  as  if  in  the  midst  of  secure  peace, 
against  standing  armies,  as  things  that  should  not  exist  in  a  Republic  ;  he  reconor 
mends  no  increase  of  our  land  forces,  and  but  a  trifling  one  of  our  navy.  But, 
what  is  still  more  decisive,  he  recommends,  and  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
presents  to  us,  a  revenue  measure — the  repeal  of  the  tariff — which  would  at  once 
deprive  us  of  the  means  of  carrying  on  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  he  could  not  have  meant  to  inform  us  and  the  nation  that 
he  is  anxious  to  settle  the  Oregon  controversy  at  the  line  of  49°,  for  he  says  the 
contrary.  He  long  ago  submitted  the  only  thing  lie  ever  did  that  looked  to  suck 
a  settlement ;  and  he  tells  us  that  the  door  to  compromise  is  closed  forever,  and 
that  he  now  claims  the  whole  territory  of  Oregon. 

I  myself,  then,  can  draw  from  his  conduct  but  one  conclusion  :  that  the  ques- 
tion being  a  very  knotty  question,  the  Executive  intended  to  place  himself  "on 
the  fence,"  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  off  on  either  side.  He  meant,  if  the  message 
was  followed  by  a  strong  manifestation  of  the  popularity  of  54°  40',  war  or  no 
war,  quietly  to  slide  off  on  that  side  ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  deliberate  judge- 
ment of  the  American  people  was  given  in  favor  of  a  fair  and  amicable  compromise, 
then  some  of  his  learned  and  ingenious  friends,  practised  in  the  art  of  explaining 
things,  were  to  rise  and  show  conclusively  that  from  the  beginning  the  President 
■was  altogether  in  favor  of  49°  and  against  54°  40'.  This,  sir,  is  niy  conclusion, 
after  reading  the  message  and  hearing  the  elaborate  and  ingenious  contrary  inter* 
pretations  put  upon  it  by  honorable  Senators,  friends  of  the  President.  Each  inr 
terpretation  is  so  lucid,  forcible,  and  conclusive,  that  they  destroy  each  other,  and 
plainly  prove  that  both  are  wrong  ;  that  the  President  goes  for  neither,  but  places 
himself  impartially  upon  the  fence. 

Now,  to  give  the  main  reasons  why  I  hold  that  the  President  and  his  Premier 
have  entirely  mismanaged  the  business,  let  me,  first  of  all,  remark,  that  such  a 
question,  originally  broached  by  the  Executive  in  a  mannar  that  at  once  made  it 
necessary  and  yet  difficult  to  settle  it,  could  not  but  be  furliier  mismanaged  in 
consequence  of  this  attempt  to  be  on  both  sides  of  it.  Let  me,  tV'""  call  the 
Senate's  attention  to  the  objectionable  grounds  taken  in  the  first  comniuuicalion 
from  the  new  Admiuistralion  to  the  British  envoy  for  the  purpose  of  renewing 


8 

ihe  negotiation.     To  the  preceding  Secretary,  (now  the  Senator  from  Soatl  met  the  ca 
Carolina,)  an  offer  had  been  made  on  the  British  part.     It  had  been  rejected  by  heard  that 


I 


our  Government.  The  British  negotiator  had  then  invited  a  reference  to  arbitra 
tion.  That  had  been,  (I  think  very  properly,)  declined,  but  for  reasons  fair 
atatesmanly,  and  friendly,  entirely  unlike  those  on  which  a  like  offer  has  lalel 
been  declined  on  our  part.  In  the  first  instance,  the  matter  had  not  arrived  a 
the  point  of  arbitration,  and  so  the  former  Secretary,  (Mr.  Calhoun,)  simply 
said  ;  in  the  last,  the  point  at  which  Britain  was  left,  by  the  abrupt  termination 
of  the  negotiation,  and  the  retraction  of  the  proposition  to  settle  on  the  principles 
of  compromise  at  the  parallel  of  49°,  there  was  no  amicable  resort  but  arbitra 
tion.  Of  an  unconditional  surrender  of  all  further  claim  to  any  portion  of  Oregon 
Without  stopping  to  discuss  the  policy  of  the  rejection  of  that  fair  and  friendly 
mode  of  adjustment  of  our  controversy,  I  must  say  that  the  reasons  assigned  by 
Mr.  Buchanan  for  declining  to  submit  the  question  to  arbitration  are  unsound  and 
puerile,  and  reflect  no  honor  on  him  as  a  statesman. 

In  the  letter  of  our  Secretary  to  which  I  now  refer,  he  sets  out  with  uigingj 
the  question  of  title  ;  and,  before  any  offer  ^i  a  settlement  is  submitted,  he  tell8| 
the  British  Minister  many  things  very  unfit  to  incline  him  to  accept  the  coming 
proposition.  He  tells  him  that  he  is  bid  to  say,  that  had  the  Oregon  question 
been  a  new  one,  the  Executive  would  make  to  England  no  proposition  at  all. 
Is  this  not  a  strange  language  to  hold  in  a  negotiation  which  we  ourselves  had 
invited  ?  However,  (he  goes  on  to  say,)  the  President  has  found  pending  nego- 
tiations, based  on  principles  of  compromise,  and  in  consi^ence  does  not  feel  at 
liberty  abruptly  to  break  them  off.  Why  this  new  tone,  so  unlike  the  previous 
negotiations  and  the  terms  so  repeatedly  offered  by  oui  Government  ?  Why 
state  sudden  and  haughty  pretensions,  that  are  not  to  be  acted  upon,  and  can  only 
surprise  and  offend  ?  Why  talk  of  ceasing  to  treat,  when  the  conference  is  one 
of  our  own  seeking,  and  we  have  not  yet  made  a  single  offer  ?  He  proceeds  to 
tell  England,  that  while  we  believe  and  know  our  title  to'  be  unquestionable  up 
to  54°  40',  the  President  feels  constrained,  as  well  by  existing  negotiations  as  by 
the  acts  of  his  predecessors,  to  submit  a  proposition.  And  now  what  sort  of  a 
proposition?  More  advantageous  to  the  counter-party  than  those  repeatedly 
made  by  his  predecessors,  in  deference  to  whose  admissions  he  makes  it?  No, 
it  falls  short  of  them.  Is  this  negotiation  to  go  backwards  instead  of  meeting 
the  advances  made  on  the  other  side?  The  President  plainly  admits,  that  he 
yields  to  the  acts  of  his  wise  predecessors  :  either,  then,  he  avows  himself 
bound  by  some  moral,  or  political,  or  legal,  or  diplomatic  authority,  or  by  several 
of  these  at  once.  If  it  binds  iiim,  why,  then,  does  he  not  conform  to  it?  If  it 
bound  him  at  all,  it  bound  him  to  go  at  least  as  far  as  it  had  gone.  He  has  said 
that  he  found  pending  negotiations  on  the  basis  of  a  compromise  :  what  would 
that  be  in  the  case  of  a  renewed  negotiation?  Clearly,  that  setting  out  from  the 
old  concessions  on  either  side,  both  parties  should  offer  some  additional  one. 
Sir,  I  cannot  forbear  remarking  that  these  Polk  negotiations  seem  to  have  been 
conducted  rather  on  the  horse-tradin?  principle.  I  do  not,  however,  mean  to 
quarrel  with  the  President  so  much  for  this  coming  short  in  the  proposition  made 
as  with  the  next  act  in  connexion  with  it.  Its  rejection  could  have  been  no  mat- 
ter of  surprise,  and  it  was  at  once  refused  by  the  British  negotiator,  in  terms,  as 
neither  reasonable  nor  fair.  Thereupon  it  was  immediately  withdrawn,  as  if  in 
a  huff;  the  refusal  to  entertain  and  transmit  it  was  construed  as  a  kind  of  insult; 
and  Britain  was  informed  that  our  Government  would  now  accept  of  nothing 
short  (if  the  entire  territory. 

Sir,  the  British  Minister  is  not  responsible  to  me,  nor  even  to  the  American 
people,  for  his  course  ;  yet  I  regret  that  course  ;  nay,  I  think  he  was  has';,  i  ^r- 
emptory,  and  committed  a  great  blunder,  unless  he  had  explicit  instructior..   ..  .',ich 


other.    T 
terms  offei 
tiator  for  a 
our  Secret 
added  intii 
except  to 
will  read 
offer  of  41 
cerely  mat 
Secretary' 
jection. 
himself, 
a  construe 
calamitous 
.the  code 
Secretary' 
aerious. 
Was, 
adopted  ft 
have  fitly 
and  proba 
taken  in  ( 
of  reason 
is  less  th; 
was  the  o 
fessed  dij 
step  was 
personal  : 
yet  know 
plaint  ag 
Governm 
tained  its 
propositi 
comproH 
aion.     W 
propositi 
treat.     I 
the  odiei 
may  we 
was  sue 
short  of 
is  inforr 
so  that  1 
to  his  C 
Sir,  1 
tion — tl 
aider,  ii 
draw  tl 
reason, 
seize  tl 
that  thi 
cepted, 
have  1< 


or  from  Soutl; 
een  rejected  by 
ence  to  arbitra- 
reasons  fair, 
offer  has  lately 

not  arrived  at 
.HouN,)  simply 
•pt  termination 

the  principles 
)rt  but  arbitra- 
ion  of  Oregon, 
ir  and  friendly 
IS  assigned  by 
e  unsound  and 


t  with  uiging 
nitted,  he  tells 
pt  the  coming 
•egon  question 
)osition  at  all. 
ourselves  had 
ponding  nego- 
oes  not  feel  at 
e  the  previous 
ment  ?     Why 
,  and  can  only 
ference  is  one 
e  proceeds  to 
lestionable  up 
itiations  as  by 
vhat  sort  of  a 
?e  repeatedly 
ikes  it  ?     No, 
d  of  meeting 
Imifs,  that  he 
ows   himself 
or  by  several 
itoit?     If  it 
He  has  said 
what  would 
out  from  the  I 
ditional  one.  i 
■o  have  been 
ver,  mean  to 
)sition  made 
een  no  mat- 
in terms,  as 
wn,  as  if  in 
d  of  insult; 
of  nothing 


e  American 

hap')  ,  por- 
tion.  ..  ,'.ich 


met  the  case,  which  is  not  improbable.  But,  be  this  as  it  may,  I  have  never 
heard  that  a  blunder  on  one  part  justifies  or  even  extenuates  a  blunder  on  the 
other.  The  rejection  on  Mr.  Pakenham's  part  was  neither  in  itself,  nor  by  its 
terms  offensive,  and  he  was  warranted  by  the  former  example  of  our  own  nego- 
tiator for  acting  as  promptly  as  he  did.  The  manner  of  that  rejection  was,  in 
our  Secretary's  reply,  taken  exception  to,  and  the  proposition  retracted,  with  the 
added  intimation;  in  effect,  that  we  should  make  no  other,  nor  negotiate  further, 
except  to  receive  the  abandonment  of  the  whole  British  claim.  If  any  Senator 
will  read  the  last  paragraph  but  on  >  of  the  Secretary's  letter,  withdrawing  the 
offer  of  49,  the  conviction  will  be  forced  upon  his  mind,  that  either  it  was  insin- 
cerely made,  or  that  there  was  no  better  ground  for  recalling  it  than  tliat  the 
Secretary's  or  the  President's  sensibilities  were  wounded  by  that  l^noruage  of  re- 
jection. He  evidently  considers  something  in  the  manner  used  as  iii^-'ilting  to 
himself,  or  to  his  superior.  That  was  indeed  going  back  to  feudal  dim  s,  when 
a  constructive  affront  to  a  King's  favorite  or  his  mistress  plunged  iia  ions  into 
calamitous  wars !  I  say  a  "constructive  affront,"  for  even  the  licest  logic  of 
.the  code  of  honor  can  make  nothing  more  of  it ;  and  au  equa!  scrutiny  into  the 
Secretary's  own  corn municalions  will  detect  violations  of  punctilio  ai  least  as 
serious. 

Was,  t'len,  the  serious  interest  of  the  country  ;  was  the  policy  deliberately 
adopted  for  it ;  were  the  grave  obligations  and  authorities  which  'ould  alone 
have  fitly  determined  the  President's  offer ;  was  the  peace  of  two  great  nations, 
and  probably  of  th(i  world,  to  be  greatly  jeoparded,  if  not  abandoned,  by  a  step 
taken  in  obedience  to  menacing  and  questionable  punctilio?  Is  this  age  of  peace, 
of  reason,  of  Christianity,  of  civilization,  one  in  which  the  substance  of  things 
is  less  than  such  shadows  ?  But,  sir,  again  I  ask  why,  if  made  in  good  faith, 
was  the  offer  to  compromise  on  the  parallel  of  49°  withdrawn?  I  am  not  a  pro- 
fessed diplomatist;  nor,  indeed,  is  the  President;  but,  diplomatically,  this  grave 
step  was  still  more  indefensible.  The  offence,  if  it  was  one,  was  clearly  the 
personal  act  of  the  Minister  only — the  manner  of  his  rejecting  a  proposition  not 
yet  known  to  his  Government.  At  worst,  then,  it  was  only  a  ground  of  com- 
plaint against  hitn  to  his  Court,  nnd  not  of  any  change  of  conduct  towards  that 
Government  itself — of  the  angry  wiihdrawal  of  any  offer  to  it,  until  it  had  sus- 
tained its  agent  in  the  offence  committed.  But  the  President  did  withdraw  his 
proposition,  and  by  his  course  in  retracting  it,  and  declining  formally  all  further 
compromise,  he  converted  into  an  ultimatum  that  which  was  not  even  a  conces- 
sion. N^ow,  in  no  amicable  negotiation  can  an  ultimatum  be  made  of  a  first 
proposition.  To  set  out  in  that  way  would  be  to  prescribe,  to  dictate,  not  to 
treat.  But,  could  ii  be  done,  you  would  be  bound,  at  least  in  laying  it  before 
the  other  party  for  acceptance  or  rejection,  to  let  them  know  it  is  final,  that  they 
may  weigh  the  consequences  of  refusal.  Here  the  nature  of  the  proposition 
was  such  as  made  it  impossible  for  the  other  party  to  suppose  it  final ;  it  being 
short  of  all  propositions  before  made,  ho  declines  to  entertain  it ;  whereupon  he 
is  informed,  not  only  that  it  was  an  ultimatum,  but  that  it  is  withdrawn  altogether, 
80  that  he  shall  now  not  even  have  the  power  to  accept  it,  or  even  to  convey  it 
to  his  Government  for  its  consideration  and  decision. 

Sir,  I  think  I  have  shown  that  this  management  will  not  bear  close  examina- 
tion—the criticism  of  plain,  common,  honest  sense.  But  let  us  proceed  to  con- 
sider, in  the  same  way,  the  consequences.  There  was  clearly  no  need  to  with- 
draw the  proposition  because  declined  by  the  Minister.  No  need?  Yea,  no 
reason,  unless  it  was  insincerely  made,  and  the  Administration  wanted  only  to 
seize  the  first  pretext  for  retracting  it ;  in  which  case,  it  is  only  to  be  remarked, 
that  they  should  never  have  made  it;  for  unquestionably  either  we  wanted  it  ac- 
cepted, or  we  did  not.  If  we  did,  we  should  still  want  it,  and  should  therefore 
have  left  it  in  the  power  of  the  British  Government,  which  could  (and,  as  wa 


1# 

now  know,  would  probably)  have  acted  on  it  when  reported  by  its  Minister. 
But,  if  we  did  not  want  it  accepted,  we  should  never  have  made  it,  not  only  be- 
cause It  was  acting  in  ill  faith,  but  because  the  offer,  the  rejection,  and  the  with- 
drawal inevitably  placed  both  Governments  in  a  much  worse  position  than  be- 
fore ;  for  now  there  arc  not  only  puncUlios  afloat,  popular  and  party  excitement. 
Presidential  electioneering,  military  plans  and  preparations,  but  owr  Government, 
after  offering  49°,  is  peicmplorily  contending  for  54°  40';  while  England,  after 
refusing  49°,  is  now  to  treat  of  giving  up  to  54°  40',  or  not  to  treat  at  all ! 

But  observe  again :  Is  ilie  rejection  of  a  proposition  any  reason  why  it  should 
be  withdrawn  ?  If  it  is,  then  all  propositions  must  be  accepted  when  made.  If 
withdrawn  as  soon  as  declined,  what  will  remain  to  treat  about?  How  is  nego- 
tiation to  go  forward  but  from  less  advantageous  to  more  advantageous  offers-— 
the  former  remaining,  when  refused,  as  a  basis,  a  scaffolding  for  the  next  ?  Strike 
it  away  each  time,  and  what  have  you  to  stand  on,  or  how  are  you  to  mount  t 
Then,  again,  were  the  British  offers  withdrawn  as  soon  as  declined  ?  Certainly 
not.  There  stand  their  tender  of  arbitration,  and  all  their  otlier  offers,  to  be  re- 
curred to  when  we  like.  True,  the  offers  on  both  sides  in  1826  were  withdrawn 
in  the  form  of  a  protest,  that  in  future  negotiations  the  parties  would  not  hold, 
themselves  bound  or  concluded  by  any  concessions  then  made ;  but  that  was 
when  it  was  found  that  nolliing  final  and  satisfactory  could  be  concluded,  and  tho 
temporary  convention  of  1818  was  renewed.  In  a  word,  they  were  not  even  in 
that  manner  withdrawn  until  the  negotiation  had  fallen  thiough ;  and  that  is  the 
only  time  when  offers  can  be,  with  any  propriety,  retracted.  Then  alone  is  any 
such  shifting  not  unfriendly  and  disrespectful. 

So  much  as  to  forms,  and  now  of  the  effects  of  that  withdrawal.  Sir,  of  it 
we  all  now  know  enough  to  say,  with  something  like  certainty,  tliat  but  for  that 
ill-judged  and  unfortunate  step,  a  treaty  on  nearly  that  basis,  quite  satisfactory 
to  the  mass  of  this  country,  and  quite  honorable  to  the  Administration,  would 
have  been  by  this  time  not  only  concluded,  but  ratified.  I  need  scarcely  add  my 
reasons  for  saying  so:  the  regret  subsequently  expressed  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons by  the  British  Premier,  that  the  Minister  had  not  transmitted  tiie  proposi- 
tion for  the  coMsideraiion  of  his  Government,  instead  of  declining  to  entertain  it,, 
is  pregnant  with  meaning.  If  he  (Sir  Robert  Peel)  added,  that  "he  was  not  pre- 
pared to  say  it  would  have  been  entirely  acceptable,"  yet  that  form  of  expression 
certainly  shows  that  he  regarded  it  as  only  requiring  some  modifications,  such  a*, 
should  not,  with  either  side,  have  stood  in  the  way  of  adjustment.  Need  I  re- 
peat, then,  that  the  failure  is  entirely  the  consequence  of  the  retraction  of  our 
offer  ?  That  unhappy  punctilio,  or  that  still  worse  insincerity,  is  the  cause  of  it 
all?  I  fear,  sir,  that  we  have  not  done  with  that  needless  and  dangerous  point 
of  honor.  Idle  as  it  is,  at  best,  between  nations,  and  shameful  as  it  would  be  if 
such  a  mere  cobweb  were  stronger  than  the  bonds  of  brotherhood,  peace,  and  in- 
terest between  two  great  kindred,  Christian,  and  sagacious  States,  yet  it  has  so 
served  with  its  false  difficulties  to  complicate  all  the  real  ones  of  the  subject,  that 
I  fear  it  still.  Alas!  once  entangled  in  such  things,  the  bravest  cease  to  know 
what  they  are  about,  the  wisest  become  weak.  'Too  often  have  I  seen  so.'ue  oC 
the  best  men  in  my  State  fall  a  sacrifice  to  nothing  but  a  punctilio. 

Well,  thus  was  the  negotiation  ended — abruptly  closed — without  cause,  with- 
out excuse,  in  August  last.  And  now  I  come  to  another  part  of  the  mischievous 
machinery  which  the  President  has  employed  throughout  this  matter. 

From  the  beginning,  with  an  openness  never  before  ventured,  even  by  his  bold- 
estpredecessor,  he  had  allowed  to  be  set  up  here  a  journal  destined  to  receive  every 
Executive  favor,  and  avowedly  speaking  in  his  name,  but  constantly  misleading  the 
public,  at  home  and  abroad.  I  hold  the  Executive  responsible  for  every  thing 
which  has  appeared  in  the  "Union"  relative  to  tliis  Oregon  controversy,  not- 
withstanding the  Senator  from  Indiana  (Mr.  Hanneoan)  denied  here  in  his  place» 


on  one  mei 
sident.     A 
the  Execut 
misinterpre 
matter  whii 
a  stop  to  it 
'  Union," 
anything,  i 
live  was  pr 
During  tha 
England — 
tempting  to 
and  the  Pr< 
yield  the  h 
Ihe  "  Unio 
ber  from  ov 
such  extrer 
presented— 
succor  of  t 
were  well  ( 
Can  any  oi 
public  of  bi 
if  not  to  be 
policy  and 
permitted  t 
everybody 
of  public  f( 
itself  deper 
the  midst  o 
Well,  b) 
gent  us.     ( 
gone  befori 
among  wh 
ginia  and  1 
glad  oraeni 
saw  that,  i 
none,"  the 
that  that  p 
how  anyll: 
and  that  t 
dined.     I 
I  themselve 
yet, in  ev( 
forthcomi 
What  i 
sent  forth 
an  amical 
breathe  tl 
spcclable 
cation  of 
it  introdu 
him  in  ef 
Sir,  su 
dent  info 
far  from 


its  Minister. 

not  only  be- 
nd the  with- 
ion  than  be- 

excitement» 
Government, 
iigland,  after 
9i  all ! 

hy  it  should 
in  made.  If 
ow  is  nego- 
ous  offers— 
ext?  Strike 

to  mount  ? 
Certainly 
rs,  to  be  re- 
!  withdrawn 
lid  not  hold, 
ut  that  was 
led,  and  tho 
not  even  in 
1  that  is  tlie 
lone  is  any 

Sir,  of  it 
but  for  that 
satisfactory 
tion,  would 
ely  add  my 
le  of  Com- 
lie  proposi- 
sntertain  it^ 
as  not  pre- 
expression 
IS,  such  a*. 
Need  I  re- 
ion  of  our 
cause  of  it 
rous  point 
i^ould  be  if 
3e,  and  in- 
t  it  has  so 
l>ject,  that 
e  to  know 
n  sorae  of 

use,  wilh- 
schievous. 

'  his  bold> 
live  every 
'ading  the 
ery  thing 
ersy,  not- 
Ills  place^ 


on  one  memorable  occasion,  that  the  "  Union"  expiessed  the  opinions  of  the  Pre- 
sident. And  why  do  I  hold  him  to  this  responsibiliy  ?  Because  all  know  that, 
the  Executive  can  control  it  at  pleasure.  If,  then,  its  supposed  official  language 
misinterprets  him,  puts  him  in  a  false  position,  does  mischief  in  a  great  national 
matter  which  he  is  conducting,  he  is  responsible  for  its  course  if  he  does  not  put 
a  stop  to  it  or  disavow  its  authority  to  speak  for  him.  Now,  the  labors  of  th& 
"  Union,"  from  August  last  till  the  meeting  of  Congress  in  December,  tended  U> 
anything,  in  this  Oregon  question,  but  the  promotion  of  that  which  the  Execu- 
tive was  professing  to  desire — a  peaceful  adjustment  of  the  pending  controversy. 
During  that  time  its  language  was  such  as  to  inflame  this  country  and  irritate 
England — to  stir  up  the  popular  passions  of  the  two  countries,  instead  of  at- 
tempting to  aliay  them — vehemently  asserting  our  right  to  the  whole  territory^ 
and  the  President's  bounden  duty  to  get  it  all,  when  he  had  already  offered  to 
yield  the  half.  What  good  purpose  coult',  all  this  extravagance  on  the  part  of 
the  "  Union"  serve  ?  While  the  whole  negotiation  was  concealed  up  lo  Decem- 
ber from  our  people,  and  its  existence,  I  believe,  denied  in  the  Executive  organ, 
such  extreme  pretensidns  were  urged  there — such  inflammatory  national  topics 
presented — such  extraordinary  appeals  to  the  Democratic  parly  to  come  to  the 
succor  of  the  President,  in  his  patriotic  efi'orls  to  get  the  whole  of  Oregon,  aa 
were  well  calculated  to  offend  England  and  bewilder  and  alarm  our  own  people. 
Can  any  ono  divine  why  such  active  pains  were  taken  to  deceive  and  excite  the 
public  of  both  countries  ?  The  public  was  not  conducting  the  negotiations  ;  and 
if  not  to  be  enlightened,  still  less  was  it  to  be  inflamed.  Every  consideration  of 
policy  and  peace  forbade  the  hostile  demonstrations  in  which  the  "  Union"  was 
permitted  to  indulge  all  the  summer  and  fall.  Their  effect  in  England  was,  as 
everybody  knew  must  happen,  highly  irritating,  and  could  not  but  beget  a  stale 
of  public  feeling  there  which  made  it  much  more  difficull  for  that  Governmert— 
itself  dependent,  like  our  own,  on  its  popularity — to  make  any  concr'ssions  ia 
the  midst  of  conduct  and  a  tone  so  overbearing. 

Well,  by  and  by  Congress  assembles ;  the  message,  with  its  documents,  is 
»ent  us.  On  the  country  at  large,  alarmed  with  the  rattle  of  preparation  that  had 
gone  before  if,  the  effect  was  quite  sedative.  Some  of  the  friends  of  peace — 
among  whom  may  be  remembered  particularly  the  Senators  near  me  from  Vir- 
ginia and  North  Carolina,  (Messrs.  Archkr  and  Manoum) — hailed  it  as  giving 
glad  omens  of  everything  pacific.  Upon  me  the  effect  was  quite  diflferent.  I 
saw  that,  notwithstanding  all  the  bluster  of  the  "  organ"  about  the  "  whole  or 
none,"  that  the  President  had  made  an  oflfer  to  settle  on  the  rallel  of  49°,  and 
that  that  proposition  had  been  rejected  and  withdrawn.  I  could  not  perceive 
how  anything  was  lelt  open  for  the  adverse  party  but  a  tender  of  arbitration ;. 
and  that  the  temper  and  spirit  of  the  message  led  me  to  believe  would  be  de- 
clined. In  a  word,  .hough  I  could  not  believe  ihe  American  people  would  allow 
themselves  to  be  drajfged  or  to  be  blundered  into  a  war  for  "  all  Oregon  or  none," 
yet, in  every  point  my  apprehensions  were  increased,  not  diminished,  by  the 
forthcoming  of  the  message. 

What  is  its  character  as  to  this  controversy  ?  Is  it  such  as  should  have  been 
sent  forth  to  us  and  the  world,  if  the  Executive  desired  sincerely  and  honesdy 
an  amicable  adjustment  of  the  question  ?  In  my  judgment  it  is  not.  It  does  not 
breathe  thai  lone  of  moderation  and  peace  which  must  be  observed  between  r-- 
spectable  nations  at  all  times,  and  particularly  in  their  disputes.  I)y  the  publi- 
cation of  Se  extreme  ground  taken,  it  made  it  more  difficult  to  recede  from  it; 
it  introduced  topics  by  no  means  necessary,  and  far  from  being  of  a  sort  to  aid 
him  in  effecting,  at  any  time,  a  pc«c  ful  settlement  of  the  question. 

Sir,  subsequent  facts  have  made  it  clear  that  when,  by  the  message,  the  Presi- 
dent informed  us  that  he  placed  little  or  no  further  hope  in  negotialioit.  it  was 
far  from  being  at  an  end.     Indeed,  it  is  now  apparent  that  the  aanunciaiioii  that 


yte  could  treat  no  further  was  but  a  feint,  partly  for  domestic  politics  and  partly 
that,  by  holding  out  strong  legislative  measures  as  to  Oregon,  and  the  hope  of  a 
free-trade  tariff,  we  might  both  intimidate  and  bribe  Great  Britain  into  large  con- 
cessions, which  might  make  a  boast  for  this  Administration.  This  dangerous 
game  of  intimidation  Congress  was  to  help  play.  Even  now  we  are  kindly  told 
by  the  "  organ"  that  unanimity  in  Congress  is  all  that  is  wanting  to  enable  the 
Executive  to  carry  triumphantly  his  point.  What  that  point  is  none  of  us  know, 
and  about  which  scarcely  two  of  his  friends  on  this  floor  agree.  One  while  lec- 
turing and  then  cajoling  us,  the  "  organ"  bids  us  see  that  all  we  have  obtained 
(I  should  like  to  know  what  it  is,  by-the-by)  is  by  threatening  demonstrations.  I 
make  no  doubt  that,  from  the  strong  desire  of  peace  displayed  by  England,  some- 
thing might  have  been  gained  in  this  way  ;  but  they  who  devised  this  reputable 
plan  should  have  had  some  prudence,  some  moderation,  and  known  when  to 
strike.  They  have  pushed  it  too  far,  have  awakened  her  pride,  and  will  proba- 
bly get  nothing  by  their  game  of  brag.  At  all  events,  the  method  is  a  most  haz- 
ardous, and  by  no  means  a  reputable  one. 

I  consider  it  perfectly  clear,  from  the  contemporary  recommendations  of  the 
Subtreasury  and  of  the  reduction  of  the  tariff,  that  no  armed  difficulty  with  Eng- 
land was  designed  or  expected.  The  supineness  of  the  Cabinet  as  to  urging  on 
Congress  to  the  military  and  naval  readiness  which  it  recommended,  is  a  further 
"bm  a  needless  proof  that  peace  only  was  looked  for.  Indeed,  when  a  war  is 
really  apprehended,  a  wise  and  discreet  Government  does  as  Great  Britain  has 
been  doing;  it  says  nothing  of  it,  but  goes  about  preparation  quietly  and  vigor- 
ously; and  if  suspicion  is  excited,  and  questions  are  asked,  it  answers  evasively. 

To  the  other  coercive  steps  proposed  by  the  Executive,  I  need  but  little  advert. 
Except  the  notice  that  the  existing  convention  of  joint  occupation  shall  terminate 
after  a  year — a  step  hich  may  probably  be  harmless,  and  wh'ch  the  action  of 
the  Executive  has  rendered  necessary — they  all  have  three  gri  <d  faults  ;  they 
are  parts  of  a  hostile  system,  and  hostilities  are  not  really  det  "ned ;  but  the 
talking  of  them  cannot  fail  to  produce  more  ill  blood.  We  have  w  deal  with  a 
people  more  prudent,  but  not  a  whit  less  resolute  than  ourselves.  We  should 
certainly  take  fire  at  such  measures;  so  will  they.  We  should  only  yi, .  I  less,  in- 
stead of  more,  in  consequence  of  all  measures  meant  to  make  us  give  back;  and 
every  reflecting  man  must  know  that  the  efl"ect  on  John  Bull  will  be  the  same. 
Almost  equally  do  I  believe,  as  a  gratuitous  departure  from  the  proper  course  on 
matters  under  negotiation,  the  President's  introduction  into  th«  message  of  a 
declaration  that  the  free  navigation  of  the  Columbia  is  not  to  be  given  up.  It  is 
really  as  much  out  of  place  as  his  original  declaration  about  Oregon  in  his  inau- 
gural. Sir,  suppose  we  were  met  in  the  same  way  ?  And  why  should  we  not 
be  ?  If  nations  proceed  in  that  way,  how  can  they  ever  settle  their  difficulties 
but  by  the  sword  ?  Nay,  when  tired  of  fighting,  what  are  they  to  do  ?  Recom- 
mence the  game  of  hot  and  downright  assertion  ?  Have  we  not  repeatedly  of- 
fered this  navigation  ?     So  our  Secretary  was  obliged  to  admit. 

This  correspondence  and  the  message  place  the  thing  on  a  very  different  foot- 
ing; and  thus  does  this  Administration  constantly  shift  its  grounds  in  the  whole 
question.  Is  there  any  principle  involved  ?  None  which  preceding  Administra- 
tions (as  wise  and  patriotic  as  this  one)  could  see,  when  they  voluntarily  oflTered 
it.  Have  we  not  claimed  the  same  principle  as  to  the  St.  Lawrence  ?  Did  we 
not  obtain  it  in  earlier  times  of  Spain,  as  to  the  Mississippi,  with  even  a  privilege 
of  deposite  at  New  Orleans,  then  Spanish  ?  Were  we  not  near  going  to  war  for 
it  just  before  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  ?  And  h*as  not  England  lately  conceded 
it  to  us  in  the  St.  John's  ?  There  is,  then,  no  principle  involved.  As  to  interest, 
the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Columbia,  and  that  of  Goose  Creek,  (now  clas- 
sically Tiber,)  which  flowr  through  this  city,  are  nbout  equally  valuable. 

The  allusions  in  the  message  to  the  European  Goveraments  are  anything  but 


wise,  unles 
the  event  o 
Powers  wh 
things  to  e 
the  guardi 
made  for  a 
some  troub 
I  allude,  of 
by  Mr.  Po 
treat  with  i 
we  are  no\ 
shall  now 
linent." 
cessary  to 
gon  ?  "  It  i 
validity,  nc 
title,  howe 
every  tlilnj 
it,  and  it  si 
tain  our  rif 
of  Louisia 
contiguity. 
Did  we  CO 
ly  overruli 
nent  is  anj 
markable  i 
and  shifts 
of  claims 
absolutely 
of  claims  1 
simply  bee 
And  why 
and  party  < 
are  appeal 
Sir,  we 
but  we  cai 
of  the  wor 
they  woul 
trines.  Ca 
on  the  nei 
trustees  ? 
restricted, 
lion  of  th' 
of  the  nev 
ence  of  th 
States  tha 
States  wil 
tectlon,  w 
and  nevei 
against  tl 
difficultie 
never  she 
rary  anil 
evil  and  t 
for  the  or 


13 


cs  and  partly 
the  Hope  of  a 
nto  large  con- 
lis  dangerous 
re  kindly  told 
to  enable  the 
eof  us  know, 
>ne  while  lec- 
lave  obtained 
nstrations,  I 
igland,  some- 
this  reputable 
)wn  when  to 
id  will  proba- 
s  a  most  haz- 

lations  of  the 
ty  with  E'ng- 

to  urging  on 
d,  is  a  further 
ten  a  war  is 
t  Britain  has 
y  and  vigor- 
3rs  evasively. 
I  little  advert, 
lall  terminate 
the  action  of 

faults ;  they 
ned;  but  the 

deal  with  a 

We  should 
(Ti.  .lless,  in- 
ve  back ;  and 
)e  the  same, 
per  course  on 
nessage  of  a 
en  up.  It  is 
1  in  his  inau-  j 
lould  we  not  f 
ir  difficulties 
0  ?  Recom- 
epealedly  of- 

lifferent  foot- 
in  the  whole 
Administra- 
arily  offered 
f  ?  Did  we 
n  a  privilege 
ig  to  war  for 
!ly  conceded 
s  to  interest, 
,  (now  clas- 
able. 
tiything  but 


wise,  unless  we  have  no  need  of  even  natural  sympathies  against  England,  ira 
the  event  of  conflict  with  that  Power.  The  unfriendly  reference,  however,  t» 
Powers  whom  it  is  so  entir«'ly  our  business  to  coQciliate,  if  we  mean  to  push 
things  to  extremity  with  England,  is  coupled  with  a  renewal  of  that  claim,  to  be 
the  guardians  and  dictators  of  everything  on  this  continent,  which  we  once 
made  for  a  special  purpose,  but  in  terms  far  too  sweeping,  so  that  ii  gave  u& 
some  trouble  then,  and  had  been  willingly  left  to  slumber  unrepeatcd  until  now  t 
I  allude,  of  course,  to  the  famous  declaration  of  President  Monroe,  now  revived 
by  Mr,  Polk,  to  be  brandished  against  the  very  nation  that  we  have  invited  to 
treat  with  us,  and  to  whom  we  have  offered  half  the  region  in  dispute.  To  he'^ 
we  are  now  made  to  say,  in  Mr,  Monroe's  words,  "  that  no  European  Power 
shall  now  or  henceforth  be  allowed  to  colonize  any  portion  of  llie  American  con- 
tinent," Why  put  forth  such  an  assumption  at  such  a  juncture?  Was  it  ne- 
cessary to  secure  the  American  people's  rights,  to  strengthen  their  title  in  Ore- 
gon ?  It  is  a  ground  so  imperative  and  so  comprehensive,  that,  if  it  has  any 
validity,  no  otiier  was  to  be  mentioned.  It  puts  aside  all  forms  and  sources  of 
title,  however  recognised  by  the  universal  consent  of  nations,  and  rides  over 
every  thing,  with  the  single  annunciation  "  that  we,  the  United  Slates,  have  said 
it,  and  it  shall  be  so."  VVhat  did  we  mean,  then,  by  discussing  with  Great  Bri- 
tain our  rights  through  Gray,  through  Liwis  and  Clarke,  through  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana,  through  the  Sp.iuish  cession  of  1819?  Why  urge  continuity,, 
contiguity,  or  even  "  manifest  destiny,"  or  David's  psalms  or  the  Pope's  bull  ? 
Did  we  condescend  to  discuss  such  petty  points  while  we  stood  upon  this  utter- 
ly overruling  one  ?  Did  we  offer  all  beyond  49°,  when  no  where  on  this  conti- 
nent is  any  European  Power  to  be  allowed  to  come  '  Sir,  this  is  another  re- 
markable instance  of  the  unhesitating  manner  in  which  this  Administration  takes 
and  shifts  positions.  How  can  men  be  dealt  with,  who  enter  into  a  discussioa 
of  claims  with  you,  produce  their  titles,  and  then  suddenly  tell  you  of  one  that 
absolutely  estops  all  others,  but  not  even  alluded  to  in  the  previous  comparisoa 
of  claims  ?  Why  had  it  not  been  stated,  if  it  was  relied  upon  ?  Why,  but 
simply  because  it  would  not  have  borne  to  be  sifted  in  a  regular  negotiation. 
And  why  was  it  only  clapped  into  the  message  ?  Because,  in  a  mere  popular 
and  party  document,  very  bad  reasons  will  go  down,  and  public  passions  only 
are  appealed  to. 

Sir,  we  may  announce  this  fiat  of  ours  as  much  as  we  please  to  our  people, 
but  we  can  never  maintain  it  in  intercourse  or  discussion  with  the  other  powers 
of  the  world  ;  we  never  have  been  able  to  do  it;  for  nations  are  compelled,  if 
they  would  be  respected,  to  confine  themselves  to  reasonable  and  feasible  doc- 
trines. Can  we  impose  this  proposition  on  either  the  old  world  or,  in  spite  of  them, 
on  the  new  world,  of  which  this  new  doctrine  would  make  us  the  sell-appointed 
trustees  ?  Originally  we  made  the  declaration  in  an  extravagant  form,  but  for  a 
restricted,  a  practical,  and  a  justifiable  purpose— disinterestedly  :  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  weak  against  the  strong ;  of  young  freedom  against  old  despotism  ;. 
of  the  new-formed  Spanish  Amijrican  Republics  against  the  threatened  interfer- 
ence of  the  Holy  Alliance,  to  help  Spain  resubjugate  them.  Of  course,  those 
States  that  were  then  to  profit  by  it  did  not  quarrel  with  its  terms  ;  b.it  those 
States  will  no  longer  acquiesce  in  it  now,  when,  instead  of  their  common  pro- 
lection,  we  are  threatening  to  become  their  common  enemy.  Europe  never  did 
and  never  can  submit  to  the  declaration.  It  is,  then,  if  enforced,  to  be  enforced 
against  the  entire  earth.  What  purpose  can  it  answer,  then,  but  to  get  us  into- 
difficulties,  aiul  lower  our  public  reputation  as  a  people  respecting  the  right?  It 
never  should  have  been  made  ;  for  it  never  was  necessary,  even  for  the  tempo- 
rary and  limited  purpose  for  which  it  was  intended.  Sufficient  for  the  day  the 
evil  and  the  good  ih^-eof;  and  a  wise  nation,  contenting  itself  with  providing 
for  the  one  or  the  Oi     r,  will  entangle  itself  in  its  foreign  policy  with  none  of 


14 

iheae  extensive  pledges.  We  had  only  to  say  on  that  occasion,  that,  if  the 
Holy  Alliance,  which  had  nothing  to  do  on  this  continent,  interfered  in  favor  of 
Spain,  we  should  stand  by  the  new  republics,  and  that  England  was  ready  to 
join  us  in  that  course.  That  wiiS  really  all  that  the  thing  meant — the  practical 
paii  of  it ;  and  all  that  exceeded  this  only  served  (as  may  be  seen  in  Mr.  Richard 
Rush's  late  book)  to  embarrass  us  in  another  important  question  then  pending 
But  mark,  in  what  speedily  followed,  how  valid  we  ourselves  held  the  declara 
tion,  as  capable  of  being  opposed  to  the  subsisting  claims  of  European  nations 
Immediately  afterward,  we  recognised,  by  treaty,  the  claims  of  Russia  (never 
before  established)  down  to  54°  40'.  Moreover,  in  1827,  some  two  years  only 
after  Mr.  Monroe's  dftilaraiion,  we  offered  Great  Britain  the  line  of  49°,  and 
the  navigation  of  the  Columbia ;  and  these  being  refused,  we  renewed  the  con- 
vention of  joint  occupation.  Both  these  acts  overthrow  all  pretence  of  excluding 
the  territorial  claims  of  a  European  power  by  a  resort  to  President  Monroe's  de- 
■claration. 

But,  now,  what  is  that  declaration,  examined  by  the  rules  of  reason  ?  Either 
it  is  founded  on  a  previously  received  law  of  nations  or  upon  one  then  establish- 
ed, or  it  is  a  mere  dictum.  I  nued  not  say  it  was  not  the  first ;  if  the  second, 
nobody  made  it  but  ourselves  ;  and  ive  have  never  put  it  in  force.  It  is,  then, 
our  own  occasional  dictum  only.  That  dictum  is  to  set  aside,  at  our  pleasure, 
the  rights  of  all  others:  it  is  to  vacate  titles  that  conflict  with  it  any  where  on 
this  continent,  and  to  bind,  without  their  consent,  not  only  all  European,  but  all 
American  States.  In  other  words,  it  is  an  appeal  to  arbitrary  will  and  force  by 
this  Government  against  the  entire  earth  ! 

Or  consider  it  historically.  How  came  we  to  be  independent?  In  part,  by 
procuring  the  interference  of  France  upon  this  continent  to  aid  us.  How  can 
that  right  be  denied  to  other  American  States  at  this  day  ?  How  came  we  by 
Louisiana?  We  bought  it  of  a  European  power,  which  had  acquired  it  only 
two  years  before.  Mr.  Monroe's  very  declaration  was  made  under  a  regular 
understanding  with  England  that  she  should  interfere  along  with  us  on  this  con- 
tinent. Unpopular  as  it  may  be,  I,  then,  hiimlile  individual  as  I  am,  take  this 
occasion  to  say,  that  the  principle  of  this  famous  declaratmn,  and  the  use  to 
"which  it  is  now  put,  are  mischievous,  unsound,  wicked  ;  and  that,  if  it  is  meant 
for  any  thing  but  an  idle  boast  or  pretence — if  this  Government  ever  means  to 
net  upon  it,  regularly  to  enforce  it — your  present  institutions  must  give  way  to 
something  stronger,  more  despotic;  they  must  take  an  entirely  military  form 
und  spirit ;  we  must  set  on  foot  an  army  like  that  of  Russia,  and  a  navy  like 
that  of  England. 

While  I  thus  denounce  the  principle,  I  am  perfectly  willing  to  admit  that  a 
«ase  may  arise  (as  it  had  arisen  when  we  interfered  for  the  Spanish  colonies  in 
1824)  when  the  United  States  would  be  called  on,  by  every  consideration  of  in- 
lerest  and  of  legitimate  policy,  to  tell  any  (iovernmcnt  of  Europe,  '•  You  shall 
not  touch  this  or  that  American  island  or  State  ;  it  will  place  us  in  jeopardy." 
This,  however,  is  the  exception.  Turn  it  into  the  general,  it  is  false,  pernicious, 
and  will  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  our  Government  if  the  people  sanction  it. 
Have  we  any  right  to  object  to  the  Empire  of  Brazil  ?  What  is  it  to  us  if  Eu- 
ropeans colonize  Patagonia  or  Peru  ?  An  infusion  of  intelligiMH-e  from  any 
where  into  the  South  American  States  would  benefit  thnm,  and  indirectly  us.  In 
the  tiuie  of  Mi.  Monroe  we  interfered  under  hopes  and  sympatliius  which  have 
proved  to  be  illusory;  the  Governments  in  which*  wc  expected  to  see  such  bles- 
sings have  been  little  but  a  scourge  to  the  countries  setting  them  up.  We  can 
no  longer  interpose  for  lliom,  under  the  idea  of  sustMininjr  the  cause  of  free  prin- 
ciples, but  nnist  confine  ourselves  to  oases  whore  we  have  a  direct,  important, 
and  just  interest  of  our  own  to  guard.  In  a  word,  we  must  return  to  that  just 
and  peaceful  policy  so  wisely  and  virtuously  recommended  by  the  Father  of  his 


country, 
this  declar: 
very  bad  d 
and  could 
end — to  sn 
however, 
on  which 

In  the  o 
<!oncur. 
Executive, 
the  whole 
termine  h( 
any  thing 
war  for  thi 
to  canvass 
on  the  noti 

Sir,  I 
has  yet  obt 
aition  that, 
but  by  its 
open  to  bo 
long  after 
neither  Asl 
trading  faci 
proprietary 
ments  form 
tion  has  ye 
in  regular  \ 
the  Court 
would  be  n 
way,  if  we 
tribunal  wc 
our  title  to 
iiionst  .ated 
Sir,  it  is 
tlemen  on 
titles  to  i' 
principles  i 
that  admit 
By  the  ( 
an  uninhal 
by  certain 
])ossession 
speedily — 
from  it,  th 
else  is  lost 
may,  by  g 
reguldr  set 
in  I<oiiii<ia 
moil  til  of 
nations  ha 
only  by  s; 
Now,  V 
»is  bv  the 
fore  1790, 


15 


1,  that,  if  the 
3d  111  favor  of 
waa  ready  to 
■the  practical 

Mr,  Richard 
len  pending. 

the  declara- 
pean  nations, 
tussia  (never 
0  years  only 

of  49°,  and 
ived  the  con- 
of  excluding 
Monroe's  de- 
an ?  Either 
en  cstablish- 

the  second, 

It  is,  then, 
•ur  pleasure, 
ly  where  on 
pean,  but  all 
md  force  by 

In  part,  by 

How  can 

came  we  by 

red  it  only 

r  a  regular 

an  this  con- 

ti,  take  this 

the  use  to 

it  is  meant 

er  means  to 

?ive  way  to 

"itary  form 

a  navy  like 

idmit  that  a 
colonies  in 
ation  of  in- 

You  shall 
jeopardy." 
pernicious, 
sanction  it. 
i>  us  if  Eu- 

from  any 
•tly  us.  In 

liicli  have 

sur;h  blea- 
We  can 
f  free  prin- 
iniporiant, 
o  that  just 
thcr  of  his 


country.  For  all  these  reasons,  I  repeat  that  I  look  upon  the  introduction  of 
this  declaration  into  the  message  as  the  revival,  for  a  very  bad  application  of  a 
very  bad  doctrine.  Had  it  been  ever  so  true,  it  had  no  bearing  on  this  question, 
and  could  by  no  possibility  have  any  effect  towards  that  which  was  the  great 
end — to  smooth  the  way  to  a  fair  adjustment  of  the  Oregon  controversy.  I  must, 
however,  ndw  pass  to  other  parts  of  the  subject,  and  particularly  to  that  of  title, 
on  which  I  consider  it  necessary  briefly  to  explain  myself. 

In  the  opinion  that  our  tide  ought  not  to  be  discussed  on  this  floor,  I  cannot 
<!oncur.  We  can  no  longer  choose  whether  we  shall  discuss  it  or  not.  The 
Executive,  by  forcing  us  to  consider  whether  or  not  we  shall  assert  a  claim  to 
the  whole  of  Oregon,  war  or  no  war,  has  forced  us  to  look  into  our  tide,  and  de- 
termine how  far  it  is  valid.  Better  discuss  it  before  war  than  after  it;  better 
any  thing  than  encounter  the  public  execration  for  having  involved  the  country  iii 
war  for  that  to  which  we  have  no  title.  It  is  my  right,  and  I  think  it  my  duty, 
to  canvass  the  question  along  with  the  other  reasons  that  will  govern  my  vote 
on  the  notice. 

Sir,  I  have  a  very  indifl'erent  opinion  of  the  right  which  either  we  or  Britain 
has  yet  obtained  to  the  extlusive  possession  of  Oregon.  I  start  with  the  propo- 
sition that,  in  a  legal  sense,  there  is  no  title  acquired  to  an  unoccupied  country 
but  by  its  regular  and  permanent  occupation  and  possession  ;  that  Oregon  was 
open  to  both  us  and  England,  as  well  as  other  nations,  because  it  had  remained, 
long  after  its  discovery,  unappropriated  by  any  permanent  settlement;  that 
neither  Astor's  nor  Noolka  Sound  were  such  setdements,  but  mere  hunting  and 
trading  factories,;  that  the  existing  convention  barred,  by  exjjregs  agreement,  any 
proprietary  right  that  would  else  have  arisen,  for  either  nation,  from  the  settle- 
ments formed  since  1818,  its  date  ;  and  that,  even  setting  that  aside,  neither  na- 
tion has  yet  created  itself  any  territorial  right,  except  just  so  far  as  its  people  are 
in  regular  possession.  I  say,  then,  that  if  Great  Britain  were  as  plain  lift' before 
the  Court  of  King's  Bench  to  bring  her  action  to  oust  the  United  Slates,  she 
■would  be  non-suited  for  want  of  being  able  to  show  title;  and  Uiat,  in  the  same 
way,  if  we  were  to  proceed  against  her  before  our  own  Supreme  Court,  that  high 
tribunal  would  dismiss  the  case,  with  costs  for  the  defendant,  on  the  ground  that 
our  title  to  bo  put  into  seisen  had  not  been  nvade  out ;  wiiile  we  may  Jiave  de- 
laonst-ated  the  weakness  of  the  defendant's. 

Sir,  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  go  at  large  into  the  question  of  title.  Legal  gen- 
tlemen on  this  floor  have  already  elaborately  examined  the  American  and  British 
titles  to  \  Oregon  territory.  I  will  content  myself  with  stating  a  few  simple 
principles  of  national  law,  (about  which  there  is  no  controversy,)  with  a  few  facts 
that  admit  of  no  dispute. 

By  the  consent  of  civilized  nations  it  is  held  that  the  first  people  discovering 
an  uninhabited  country  may  appropriate  it*  The  intention  to  do  so  is  signified 
by  certain  ceremonies  of  landing,  displaying  the  national  flag,  and  declaring  the 
possession  taken.  But  if  this  act  is  not  followed  up  by  a  setUement  proceeding 
speedily — that  is,  within  such  reasonable  time  as  was  suflTicient  to  make  it— 
from  it,  tlven,  this  inchoate  right  to  complete  your  title  in  preference  to  any  body 
olse  is  lost,  and  any  other  people  to  whom  the  discovery  may  have  become  known, 
may,  by  greater  diligence,  pre-occupy  the  soil  and  perfect  a  tide  by  making  a 
regular  setdetnent.  It  was  thus  that  France,  for  instance,  secured  a  fixed  right 
in  liOiiisiana,  although  Spain  liad  discovered  and  taken  formal  possession  of  the 
moulh  (if  the  Mississippi,  birt  without  planting  any  seltlement.  This  law  of 
nations  lias,  moreover,  always  considered  as  uninliabited  all  countries  occupied 
only  by  savage  tribes. 

Now,  we  claim  Oregon  by  two-fold  discovery  :  the  Spanish,  transferred  to 
us  bv  the  Florida  treaty  of  1819,  and  going  back  to  an  uncertain  date,  ng  be- 
fore "iTOO.  and  that  of  Gray  in  1792. 


But  there  cannot  be  trvo  discoveries  of  the  same  country-  The  posterior  one 
of  Gray,  therefoic,  (let  the  Secretary  of  State  argue  as  he  may,)  is  nothing. 
The  coast,  which  is  the  country,  was  already  known ;  and  the  inchoate  right  by 
discovery  could  not  be  broken  into  and  taken  away  by  the  mere  lighting  upon 
the  mouth  of  its  chief  river.  Besides,  the  conventional  right  by  discovery  must 
follow — must  observe  the  conventional  law  of  discovery  ;  and  Gray's  was  not 
accomj-anied  by  the  acts  of  appropriation  necessary  to  signify  the  intention  of 
occupying  the  country.  He  did  not  take  possession ;  he  does  not  appear  even 
to  have  landed.  Now,  the  right  by  discovery  was  in  some  other  nation  ;  but 
as  it  had  been  neglected,  and  had  not  been  carried  forward  to  that  which  could 
alone  give  a  fixed  right,  (permanent  setdement,)  we,  or  any  body  else,  might 
then  have  acquired  that  riglit  whenever  we  settled.  And  as  Gray  made  no  set- 
tlement, he  did  not  create  for  us  a  right  in  the  only  way  in  which  he  could  have 
created  one. 

I  see  not  how  these  principles  and  facts  can  be  resisted.  Of  course  they 
.equally  overthrow  any  claim  got  from  Spanish  discovery,  since  Ppain  had  failed 
to  settle,  and  her  claim  of  discovery  had  lapsed  by  neglect.  In  the  same  way 
Lewis  and  Clarke's  exploration  is  nothing,  for  that  was  not  what  was  then  neces- 
sary to  create  a  permanent  right.  They  only  performed  the  ceremony  of  taking 
possession  ;  but  that  had  been  performed  long  before  by  Vancouver's  lieutenant, 
Broughton,  and  was  nothing.  In  short,  the  right  by  discovery  was  gone  from 
every  body  ;  the  country  was  open  to  the  occupation  of  every  nation,  and  that 
occupation  alone  could  now  confer  in  the  quarter  where  made  a  territorial  right. 
On  the  English  part  a  trading  station  was  first  fixed  at  Nootka,  and  ours  at  As- 
toria. There  was  no  point  of  even  temporary  occupation  by  Spain  north  of 
San  Franciuco,  and  no  Russian  south  of  about  56°.  I  take  it,  then,  that  the  real 
claims  of  both  England  and  ourselves  begin,  so  far  as  either  had  any,  from 
Nootka  and  Astoria.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  neither  of  these  establishments 
was  properly  a  settlement ;  they  were  trading  posts,  established  by  private  per- 
sons for  their  own  individual  purposes  ;  and  such  was  the  character  of  all  the 
places  of  which  tlie  citizens  of  either  nation  had  taken  possession  down  to  the 
time  (1818)  when  the  United  States  and  Great  Brilain  agreed  that  the  further 
settlements  of  neither  should  create  any  territorial  rights  while  tlie  joint  occupa- 
tion lastfeJ.  It  seems  to  mc  clear,  therefore,  that  neither  nation  has  yet  perfect- 
ed a  title  in  any  part  of  Oregon,  and  that  their  adverse  claims  must  become  a 
matter  of  convention  and  agreement  between  them.  What  that  arrangement 
and  division  should  equitably  be,  I  think,  is  clear. 

The  two  nations  have  created  for  themselves  better  rights  (though  not  com- 
plete ones)  in  Oregon  than  all  others,  and  each  a  belter  riglit  than  the  other  in  a 
particular  region — we  on  the  Columbia  and  up  to  49'  ;  Great  Britain  north  of 
that  line.  Our  several  original  points  of  occupation  indicate  that  line,  and  con- 
tinuity and  contiguity  of  other  territory,  in  my  view,  fixes  it.  That,  then,  seems 
to  me  the  most  positive  and  proper  basis  that  can  be  arrived  at,  and  my  mind  is 
so  much  made  up  to  this  that  I  will  not  consent  to  give  up  any  soil  south  of  it. 
If  nothing  belter  can  be  done,  1  am  willing  to  fight  for  i  Something  like  this 
I  think  the  Administration,  scorning  all  further  punctilio  and  pettifogging,  should 
offer.  I  believe  that  manly  and  friendly  course  will  be  met  by  England  in  the 
same  spirit,  and  ihat  the  great  mass  of  both  Uiese  kindred  countries  will  hail  the 
adjustment,  and  render  honor  to  the  rulers  who  shall  make  it. 

As  to  notice,  I  was  at  first  opposed  to  it,  as  lil^ely  to  beget  a  difficulty.  On 
that  point,  the  progress  of  the  discussion  and  my  own  reflections  have  changed 
my  views,  and  I  am  not  ashamed  to  avow  it.  I  now  wish  to  see  the  notice  giv- 
en, but  in  terms  entirely  conciliatory.  I  wish  it,  loo,  given  at  once,  that  the 
country  and  its  business  may  suffer  no  further  disturbance,  and  that  we  may 
linow,  before  Congress  adjourns,  what  is  to  come  of  it — peace  or  war. 


osterior  one 
I  is  nothing, 
late  riglit  by 
ghting  upon 
;overy  must 
y's  was  not 
inlentiou  of 
jppear  even 
nation  ;  but 
ivhich  could 
else,  might 
lade  no  set- 
could  have 

course  they 
n  had  failed 
B  same  way 
then  neces- 
iy  of  taking 
3  lieutenant, 
5  gone  from 
>n,  and  that 
torial  right, 
ours  at  As- 
ia north  of 
hat  the  real 
1  any,  from 
iblishments 
private  per- 
r  of  all  the 
lown  to  the 
the  further 
int  occupa- 
y^et  perfect- 
become  a 
rrangement 

1  not  com- 
I  other  in  a 
liii  north  of 
B.  and  con- 
hen,  seems 
ny  mind  is 
south  of  it. 
ig  liiie  this 
ng,  should 
and  in  the 
ill  hail  the 

^ulty.  On 
'e  changed 
notice  giv- 
e,  that  the 
at  we  may 


